


# Continuous Monitoring

## History and Directions

Kent Landfield, McAfee  
SCAP Developer Days 2012

# Continuous Monitoring – What is it?





# Description applied to Cybersecurity for use with Technical Reference Architectures



## Continuous Monitoring Defined

"Continuous Monitoring is a risk management approach to cybersecurity that maintains an accurate picture of an organization's security risk posture, provides visibility into assets, and leverages use of automated data feeds to quantify risk, ensure effectiveness of security controls, and implement prioritized remedies."

-NIST

# DHS – Continuous Monitoring



- Build capability using existing data feeds and tools
  - Component based approach
  - Based on a standardized reference architecture
  - Focused on security controls in NIST SP 800-53/CAG
  - Solutions from multiple vendors can be combined together to create a CM solution
- Phase in additional capabilities in a logical manner
- Converges with capabilities found in FISMA
- Auto Feed Metrics Requirements
  - Asset Management (CPE)
  - Configuration Management (CCE)
  - Vulnerability Management (CVE)

# DHS Continuous Monitoring Evolution

- Expanded scope of auto feed metrics
- Boundary Defense
- Audit Log Analysis
- Application Security
- Privileges
- Access
- Dormant Accounts
- Ports, Protocols, and Services
- Data Leakage Protection
- Others



# Derived Capabilities of a CM Program



- Maintains an accurate picture of an organization's security risk posture
- Provides visibility into assets
- Leverages automated data feeds
- Allows for Quantification of risk
- Ensures continued effectiveness of security controls
- Informs automated or human-assisted implementation of remediation
- Enables prioritization of remedies
- Empowers employees at multiple levels within the organization

# Important CM solution goals

- Component based approach
  - Based on a standardized reference architecture
  - Solutions from multiple vendors can be combined together to create a CM solution
- Standard-based for interoperability and scoring consistency
  - Languages
    - Using the same machine-readable expressions for checking and remediating machine state (e.g., FDCC / USGCB policy)
  - Metrics
    - Using the same equations for risk calculations
  - Nomenclatures
    - Using the same names for vulnerabilities, assets, configuration issues, and remediation options.
- Mathematically rigorous scoring approach
  - Motivational scoring is important
  - True risk calculations are also needed



# History of the CM Effort

**SAFE NEVER SLEEPS™**



# History

- Starting in 2002, FISMA required annual information security program reporting from federal agencies
- Cost since 2002 launch of FISMA reporting: **\$40B+**
  - Only **32%** of agencies received “good” or “excellent” FISMA grades in FY 2008
- White House directive to save costs: **CyberScope**
  - All Federal agencies are mandated to use CyberScope for FISMA reporting by November 15, 2010
  - As implemented, frustrating for agencies
  - [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda\\_2010/m10-15.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-15.pdf)
- White House directive to shift to reporting FISMA related metrics through CyberScope on a monthly, not yearly basis
  - <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2011/m11-33.pdf>
- **BUT:**
  - CyberScope only a “baby step” to solve CM reporting requirement
  - Long term goal: smarter networks in which Ops can have greater risk visibility

# Fiscal Year 2010 Report to Congress on the Implementation of The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002



## **A. Continuous Monitoring and Remediation**

*In FY 2011 the shift from the once-a-year FISMA reporting process to a monthly reporting of key metrics through Cyberscope will allow security practitioners to have more information than ever before to assist the protection of agency information and information systems. In the years to come, this reporting will require minimal human interaction and allow immediate remediation of many vulnerabilities.*

*While automation efforts such as the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) and continuous monitoring are not magic solutions, they do offer enterprises of all sizes the ability to enhance one's security posture at lower costs. This work has begun to pave the way for new and robust capabilities that agencies can easily adopt in the future. Applying the continuous monitoring and remediation approach must be coupled with an increased engagement across government and industry to better cooperate to address information security.*

### *Strengthening Security Management through CyberStat Model*

*To increase this cooperation, in January 2011, DHS launched CyberStat. Using the TechStatmodel, DHS cybersecurity experts will now meet with agencies regularly to ensure accountability and to help agencies develop focused actions plans to improve their information security posture.*

*CyberStat is grounded in the data provided by CyberScope, among other key data sources about agencies' information security. The development of clear and consistent metrics for CyberScope has increased the ability of DHS to hold agencies accountable for outcomes. As DHS works with agencies to improve data quality, CyberStat and CyberScope will allow DHS to assist agencies in quickly addressing problems that pose risks.*

# History of the USG CM Reference Model



- September 2010
  - DHS Federal Network Security (FNS) Branch releases ***“Continuous Asset Evaluation, Situational Awareness, and Risk Scoring Reference Architecture Report (CAESARS)”***
- February 2011
  - ***[IR 7756] NIST Interagency Report 7756 - CAESARS Framework Extension: An Enterprise Continuous Monitoring Technical Reference Architecture (Draft)***
- March 2011
  - NIST held a ***“CONTINUOUS MONITORING ARCHITECTURE WORKSHOP”*** – Initial straw man presented but too high level and vendors asked for more specifics
- September 2011
  - ***[SP 800-137] NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-137 - Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) for Federal Information Systems and Organizations***
- December 2011
  - ***[IR 7799] NIST Interagency Report (IR) 7799 – Continuous Monitoring Reference Model Workflow, Subsystem, and Interface Specifications (Draft)***
- January 2012
  - ***[IR 7800] NIST Interagency Report 7800 - Applying the Continuous Monitoring Technical Reference Model to the Asset, Configuration, and Vulnerability Management Domains (Draft)***



# Current Logistical Problems Facing CM



- Large installed base of security point products
- Lack of security automation standards to enable plug and play
- Lack of means to provide automated reach down and reporting to support federated network hierarchies
- The Continuous Monitoring Reference Architecture is more notional than reality
- Must achieve some successes today while the interface and extended security automation data model specifications are developed
  - iPost model for reporting various gather metrics

# CyberScope & CAESARS FE

**SAFE NEVER SLEEPS™**

# Differences Between CyberScope and CAESARS



## CyberScope


- Reporting at a very high level
- Currently file based transmission of results
- Hope to be automated at some point in the future
- Agencies manually transmit the collected information to the CyberScope POC
- More FISMA and CIO focused

## CAESARS FE

- A “target-state reference architecture” that *scales* for *large* government enterprise networks
- *Not* an output - a *vision* for longer term, better risk visibility
- Goal: Full plug and play network environment that can facilitate better visualization and network event awareness
- More operations focused




# CyberScope



## CyberScope requests


- Asset Inventory using SCAP Common Platform Enumerations (“CPE”) to report on total systems by CPEs.
- Configuration Data that uses checklists written using SCAP Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (“XCCDF”) to report on systems security SCAP Common Configuration Enumerations (“CCE”). Each CCE associated within a specific XCCDF benchmark are evaluated and reported within the submission.
- Common Vulnerability Enumerations (CVEs) to report on CVEs within a specific environment and an aggregate value of systems affected by the specific CVE.



## **C**ontinuous **A**sset **E**valuation, **S**ituational **A**wareness, and **R**isk **S**coring Reference Architecture



# Continuous Asset Evaluation, Situational Awareness, and Risk Scoring (CAESARS)






# CM Enterprise Architecture

- This shows an enterprise architecture view, not a technology focus view

Source: NIST IR 7756

Note: Diagram derived from NSA work (original diagram credit: Keith Willett, MITRE)



# CAESARS FE and the Continuous Monitoring




- CAESARS Framework Extension
  - Corrected issues in DHS CAESARS specification
  - <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsDrafts.html>
  - NIST-IR-7756
- Desire is to have a 'plug and play' environment for security products
- Best of Breed procurement capabilities
- Provide support for operations
- Ability to Abstract Gathered Data for Decision Makers
- Drill down when needed
- Automated Roll up for Data Calls
- New Standards needed (connection protocols and data models)
- Procurement wording to include support for this architecture
- Focusing on Situational Awareness Capabilities

# CM Instance Model


(Organizations may have multiple CM instances)

## Continuous Monitoring System Instance





# CM Instance Model Proposed Interfaces



## Interface Specifications:

Existing/  
Standardized

Current focus/  
Parameterized

Future Focus/  
Proprietary

# Continuous Monitoring: Phase 1

## Risk Scoring and iPost

- Custom application that continuously monitors and reports risk on the IT infrastructure at US Department of State
- The risk scoring program uses data integrated into iPost from various monitoring tools to produce a holistic view of vulnerabilities
- Each host and user is scored in multiple categories using the NVD CVSS scoring system
- Scores are aggregated across categories to give a risk score for the host, site, region or enterprise
- Small and large sites are compared via normalized scores
- Letter grades are applied based on normalized scores
- Exception capabilities are provided for dealing with anomaly situations








- NIST, Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach, Special Publication 800-37 (Gaithersburg, Md.: February 2010).
- Although iPost does not provide a complete view of information security risks, it helps to prioritize vulnerability mitigation efforts
- iPost Risk Scoring Program only addresses Windows host computers
- iPost's Risk Scoring Program Address several but not all NIST SP 800-53, rev. 3 IA controls

# Scoring Components of State's Risk Scoring



| Scoring Component                            | What is Scored   | Source        |
|--|--|---------------|
| 1. Vulnerability                             | Vulnerabilities detected on a host   | Scanning Tool |
| 2. Patch                                     | Incompletely installed or uninstalled patches required by a host   | SMS           |
| 3. Security Compliance                       | Failures of host to use required security settings   | Scanning Tool |
| 4. Anti-Virus                                | Out-of-date anti-virus signature file  | SMS           |
| 5. Standard operating environment compliance | Incomplete/invalid installations of any product in the Standard Operating Environment suite, of which there are 19 products        | SMS           |
| 6. AD users                                  | User account password ages exceeding 60-day threshold (scores each user account, not each host)                                    | AD            |
| 7. AD computers                              | Computer account password ages exceeding 30-day threshold  | AD            |
| 8. SMS reporting                             | SMS client agent on host is not reporting all expected information and the incomplete reporting is due to specific types of errors | SMS           |
| 9. Vulnerability reporting                   | Hosts that miss two consecutive vulnerability scans  | Scanning tool |
| Security compliance reporting                | Hosts that miss two consecutive security compliance scans  | Scanning tool |

# iPost Scoring Guidelines

| Component   | Risk Score  | Avg / Host  | % of Score   | How Component is Calculated  |
|---|---|---|--|--|
| VUL - Vulnerability        | 947.0   | 3.0   | 10.9 %   | From .1 for the lowest risk vulnerability to 10 for the highest risk vulnerability   |
| PAT - Patch   | 603.0   | 1.9   | 6.9 %  | From 3 for each missing "Low" patch to 10 for each missing "Critical" patch  |
| SCM - Security Compliance  | 6,181.2   | 19.5  | 71.2 %   | From .9 for each failed Application Log check to .43 for each failed Group Membership check  |
| AVR - Anti-Virus  | 0.0   | 0.0   | 0.0 %  | 6 per day for each signature file older than 6 days  |
| SOE - SOE Compliance  | 115.0   | 0.4   | 1.3 %  | 5 for each missing or incorrect version of an SOE component  |
| ADC - AD Computers  | 26.0  | 0.1   | 0.3 %  | 1 per day for each day the AD computer password age exceeds 35 days  |
| ADU - AD Users  | 222.0   | 0.7   | 2.6 %  | 1 per day for each account that does not require a smart-card and whose password age > 60, plus 5 additional if the password never expires |
| SMS - SMS Reporting   | 230.0   | 0.7   | 2.6 %  | 100 + 10 per day for each host not reporting completely to SMS   |
| VUR - Vulnerability Reporting   | 84.0  | 0.3   | 1.0 %  | After a host has no scans for 15 consecutive days, 5 + 1 per 7 additional days   |
| SCR - Security Compliance Reporting   | 279.0  | 0.9   | 3.2 %  | After a host has no scans for 30 consecutive days, 5 + 1 per 15 additional days  |
| <b>Total Risk Score</b>   | <b>8,687.1</b>  | <b>27.4</b>  | <b>100.0 %</b>  |  |

*For additional information on Risk Scoring, assistance with remediations, or to report suspected false positives, contact the IT Service Center to open a "Risk Score" ticket.*



# iPost Component Scoring Methodology



## Scoring

## How the Score is calculated for a host

|  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. Vulnerability                             | Sum of vulnerability scores of all detected vulnerabilities. Scores for individual vulnerabilities range from 0.01 and .1 for the lowest-risk vulnerability to 10 for the highest risk vulnerability.  |
| 2. Patch                                     | Sum of patch scores of all incompletely installed patches. Each patch is assigned a score based on its risk level: low = 3, medium = 6, high = 9, and critical = 10.   |
| 3. Security Compliance                       | Sum of all scores of all failed security compliance checks. According to one screen, the scores can range from .43 to .9 for each instance of security noncompliance. (settable)   |
| 4. Anti-Virus                                | After a grace period of 6 days, a score of 6 per day is assigned to a host with an old antivirus signature file  |
| 5. Standard operating environment compliance | Score of 5 assigned for each missing or unapproved version of a standard application.  |
| 6. AD users                                  | Score of 1 assigned for each day an account that does not require a smart-card, and are not disabled or expired, and whose password age exceeds 60 days. Accounts that have no date in AD for the last password reset are assigned a fixed score of 200. If the password is set to never expire, an additional score of 5 is assigned. |
| 7. AD computers                              | Score of 1 assigned for each day password age exceeds 35 days. (settable)  |
| 8. SMS reporting                             | One hundred plus 10 for each day since last day agent correctly reported. Before scoring begins, there is a grace period that varies from 5 to 30 days, depending on the error conditions detected.  |
| 9. Vulnerability reporting                   | Vulnerability reporting After a host has not been scanned in 15 consecutive days, a score of 5 is assigned, then increased at the rate of 1 for each additional 7 days. (settable)   |
| Security compliance reporting                | After a host has not been scanned for 30 consecutive days, a score of 5 is assigned, then increased at the rate of 1 for each additional 15 days. (settable)   |

# Resource Links Available to Users in iPost



| Resource                                 | Description  |
|--|--|
| Patch Management Web Site                | Facilitates the management, installation and monitoring of Windows operating system patches  |
| SMS post admin tool                      | Allows an SMS Administrator to accomplish tasks required to administer an SMS system   |
| IT Change Control Board baseline         | Includes a list of approved hardware and software that can be used on department systems that has been approved by the IT Change Control Board, which manages and approves changes to the department's IT infrastructure |
| Site Risk Scoring Toolkit                | Provides online reference documents that iPost users can utilize for evaluating the site risk data and scores located in iPost   |
| IT Asset Baseline                        | Maintains the department's IT asset inventory  |
| Diplomatic Security configuration guides | Documents the required configuration settings that should be in place for various operating systems  |
| IT Service Center                        | Provides technical support for department users on IT-related issues   |

| CAG ID | Consensus Audit Guidelines  |
|--------|---|
| 1      | Inventory of authorized and unauthorized hardware                       |
| 2      | Inventory of authorized and unauthorized software                       |
| 3      | Secure configurations for HW and SW, if available                       |
| 4      | Secure configurations for network devices such as firewalls and routers |
| 5      | Boundary Defense  |
| 6      | Maintenance/Analysis of complete security audit logs                    |
| 7      | Application software security   |
| 8      | Controlled use of Administrative Privileges                             |
| 9      | Controlled access based on need to know                                 |
| 10     | Continuous vulnerability testing and remediation                        |
| 11     | Dormant account monitoring and control                                  |
| 12     | Anti-malware defenses   |
| 13     | Limitation and control of ports, protocols and services                 |
| 14     | Wireless device control   |
| 15     | Data leakage protection   |



# Continuous Monitoring: Phase 2

## Bringing Definition to the CM Technical Reference Architecture

# Continuous Monitoring Interface Standards



- Need to develop the plug and play connections standards for the Query Management, Collection Controller, etc.
- Need to create data models to support queries and tasks
- Needless to say there is a great deal of work here that will not happen quickly
- Vendors need to participate and contribute where it makes sense

- **OMB M-10-15**, *FY2010 Reporting Instructions for the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and Agency Privacy Management*
  - [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda\\_2010/m10-15.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-15.pdf)
- DHS specifies **CAESARS** September 2010:
  - <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/fns-caesars.pdf>
- NIST CM policy guidance in **NIST Special Publication 800-137 - DRAFT Information Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and Organizations**:
  - [draft-SP-800-137-IPD.pdf](http://draft-SP-800-137-IPD.pdf)
- NIST-issued **CAESARS Framework Extension (FE)**:
  - [http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/nistir-7756/Draft-nistir-7756\\_feb2011.pdf](http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/nistir-7756/Draft-nistir-7756_feb2011.pdf)
- Continuous Monitoring Architecture Workshop 2011 Presentations:
  - [http://scap.nist.gov/events/2011/cm\\_workshop/presentations/index.html](http://scap.nist.gov/events/2011/cm_workshop/presentations/index.html)
- Security Automation Developer Days Winter 2011 Presentations:
  - <http://scap.nist.gov/events/2011/saddsp/presentations/index.html>